

FIVE REASONABLE PEOPLE

THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE OF MORALITY

CHAPTER 12 TYPES' POWERS IN SOCIETY

Chapter 10 worked out that life forms display three kinds of power: *power-with*, *power-to* and *power-over* on the X, Y, and Z axes, and that humans also show three kinds of cultural power-over, labelled *empathy*, *influence*, and *domination*, also on the X, Y, and Z axes. In this chapter we examine how power is traded and ponder the social effects of the types' various powers. This book's most extensive discussion of the Type 5 will be found here.

CHAPTER 12 CONTENTS

TRADING POWER	1
Domination power	2
Influence power	3
Empathy power	4
POWER AND FREEDOM	6
THE POWER OF THE 1s AND 3s	8
THE POWER OF THE 2s	13
THE POWER OF THE 4s	15
Type 4s are the only democrats	16
THE POWER OF THE 5s	17
Thailand	18
Indonesia	20
Asceticism is not essential	21
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	22
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 12	24

TRADING POWER

We have determined, in accord with mainstream scholarship, that power is exercised in three general ways: *power-to* on Y which acts on the material environment, *power-over* on Z which acts on people, and *power-with* on X which is a power of togetherness that can resist the other two powers.

Our primary interest is *power-over* which we found presents in three ways: *influence* on Y, *domination* on Z, and *empathy* on X. As the word “power” itself implies, social interactions are not entirely by preference. Humans of the four different types living together have to deal with each other and so everyone must to some extent come to terms with all three kinds of power-over: domination, influence and empathy. We are each involved in situations where power is exercised and transferred, willingly or unwillingly, from one person to another. For this interaction to be voluntary, its benefit would have to be evident, which implies some kind of *exchange*: I yield power to you in return for some benefit you supply me.

Domination power

If one willingly relinquishes personal power to *domination* by others, it will be for security. This is the social contract proposed by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century whereby an all-powerful leviathan should rule, preventing people from preying upon each other (Hobbes saw everyone as Type 1). The leviathan might be explicitly recognised: welcomed by 2s, criticised but accepted as a necessary evil by the 1s and 3s, and fatalistically suffered by the 4s.

The 1s might accept *domination* as a trade-off to yield a social environment by providing security, per Hobbes, which curbs the ruthless aspects of 1-ism and allows the orderly exercise of *influence*—i.e., of trade.

The 3s might accept domination (as a trade-off) not only to curb 1-ism but also to help foster *power-with* and *empathy* to give effect to the “general will” proposed by Jean Jacques Rousseau (who viewed people as fundamentally 3-ist) in the eighteenth century. In that case the leviathan represents the will of the people. An example of this might be the traditional left where savvy union leaders lead 4s who don’t really know what’s good for them.

For the 4s, domination is an inevitable fact of life to be evaded as much as possible, and exercised, often as brute force, as opportunity provides.

Orderly domination is exercised through 2-ism and where it is voluntarily accepted, a perennial political problem is how to curb the leviathan's propensity to boost its dominance specialty, at the expense of *influence* and *empathy* and so prey on the people it is supposed to keep secure. The solution proposed by John Locke in the late seventeenth century was that there should be a legislature to make the laws and then the actual executive government would, like everyone else, be required to obey them.

Having a legislature to make the rules that everyone, including the 2-ist executive, must obey has proved effective. Indeed, for political stability, it is a necessary institutional arrangement.

Influence power

We yield voluntarily to *influence*, such as the doctor's advice or the salesman's pitch, when we see some benefit. This is at the core of 1-ism for acquiring influence is the aim of the unequal 1-ist life. Exchange of influence is *trading* and *reciprocity* and as such would always have to be conscious and explicit, such as: sale and purchase; two people form a business partnership; an applicant considers a job offer; a couple courts.

In a hierarchy, information in the form of statistics and specialist advice flows up to influence decisions while instructions and resource allocations come down. The senior ranks yield to junior influence circumspectly, alert to misjudgement, setting the specialist advice in a wider context. This is also an exercise of *power-with*, whereby all involved gain *power-over* (at the expense of some third party, such as another individual or rival institution), and/or some *power-to* (e.g., resource acquisition) that cannot be achieved by an individual.

The nature of this power exchange, this trading of *influence*, runs much deeper than any overt hope or ambition of gaining power. This cautious exposure to the power of others is of the essence of sociality. We learn it as infants when we become aware that others have minds: we would like to know what is in another's mind and we realise that others wish to know what is in our mind. This discovery that we possess something of value leads us to trade secrets and in so doing, to trade power, to gain power over another and to give another power over oneself.

So to be social (and not drift into eremitic 5-ism) one must make oneself vulnerable. This is awkward for the 1s and 2s, with their investment in the Y axis of self-reliant pride and bad human nature, so for them the trade is difficult to achieve and thus highly valued. The 1s carefully take reputation and repeated interaction into account; the 2s carefully control rank which then specifies legitimate interaction thus providing a short-cut to individuals deciding when to make themselves vulnerable.

The 3s have no such problem; with their benign view of human nature and their non-reciprocal perspective, it is group membership which they value, rather than individual relationships. For their part, the 4s are excluded for they don't know how to establish committed interpersonal relationships or mutually supportive group membership—unless they are coerced into them via *domination*.

Empathy power

The 3s will not want to call *empathy* a form of exchange. This is because reciprocity is abhorrent to 3s: one does not give with a view to what one might receive in return—that would not be true giving. So personal secrets are not seen as tradable to 3s who may unburden themselves of their feelings and failings without inhibition. Public confession of sin is a common feature of sects.

By publicly revealing the heart, the individual receives the sympathy (or empathy) of other group members and relinquishes power to the 3-ist collective as a whole to receive benefits of forgiveness, emotional strength, trust, righteousness, and psychological support and perhaps material support vis-à-vis the world outside the group. Thus empathy contributes to power-with and, though in functional terms we can call it an exchange, it is not felt as a trade for it is the cultural version of the social contract every herd animal or shoaling fish makes, relinquishing some individual autonomy in return for the advantages of group living.

Empathy power is a crucial part of sociality; the 1s succumb to it even when it is illegitimate or explicitly illegal as in cases of collusion or nepotism. 2-ist hierarchies need empathy to generate effective teamwork and they foster it by gathering, ceremonially and informally, to make personal connections and discuss and affirm common goals and interests.

Power in survival and evolution

Chapter 10 showed that *power-over* is zero-sum. Irrespective of whether the power takes the form of 1-ist influence, 2-ist domination, or 3-ist empathy, in order for someone to gain, someone must lose.

So *power-over* is the prize of a sort of competition. The ultimate driver must be Darwinian survival of the fittest. As such, it applies in principle to all organisms though it would be noticeable only in those who are social. Creatures which evolved to be social—which increased their *power-with*—did so because they found survival benefits in togetherness which outweigh disadvantages such as disease contagion and concentrated pressure on resources.

Where such social benefits include better hunting or better security (as they often do) this enhanced *power-*

with would enhance *power-to*. This in turn may affect individual *power-over*. The strong genetic relationships in the social insects rule out individual advantage but where sociality brings the possibility of manipulation or quarrelling—as in a troop of primates—it would directly enhance the successful individuals' *power-over*. Both *power-to* and *power-over* would feed back via differential reproduction to shape the ongoing evolution of the species, tending toward a better fit to its social and physical environments along with an ever-increasing ability to shape those environments.

We have seen that to fit in and be social, an individual must relinquish some power, allowing others to have power over him or her. An individual might relinquish *power-over* for a gain in *power-to*—for example, hunting in a pack—which would increase the power of all members of the social group, or it might relinquish individual *power-over* by, say, forming an alliance or cabal for a factional gain in *power-over* whereby another faction of fellow-creatures necessarily loses power.

In non-human social animals, there are only shadowy hints of the four ways of life with their four viable combinations of the three kinds of *power-over*. Some researchers have seen what may be called X and Z (or 3-ism and 2-ism) in non-human primates. Kemper and Collins (1990) present an extensive comparison of studies across the social sciences, including primate studies.

Kemper, T. D. and R. Collins (1990). "Dimensions of microinteraction." *The American Journal of Sociology* 96(1): 32-68.

POWER AND FREEDOM

It is a premise of WOLT, and implicit to sociality, that people want the right thing to be done. Everyone should do the right thing so that people will be safe

and efficacious and society will function as smoothly as possible. Each of the three pro-active types wants people to live properly according to its lights. Each has The Truth and so has an incentive to set the world to rights. The 2s, who run everything, do not readily expatiate upon their truth because talk undermines 2-ism. Their stiff upper lip signals fortitude but 2-ism is a balancing act and reticence is a part of making 2-ism work.¹

The 1s and 3s are not so restrained; reviling 2-ist power is a favourite theme and one of the few sentiments the 1s and 3s share. Their criticism has grounds since 2-ism's specialist power—domination, leviathan power—is ever liable to cross the fuzzy line from the place where order protects or enhances freedom to where order infringes on freedom. And it is surely the case that wherever there is systemic infringement, of whatever ideological colour, there we will find the 2s, obeying orders, diligently applying their bureaucratic talents to facilitate orderly abduction, torture and murder. If the price of freedom is eternal vigilance, as is sometimes asserted, the vigilance will have to come from the 1s and 3s.

The twentieth century has shown that the democracies, which are the only modern polities where general freedom obtains, are very tough. Failure of established democracy²—collapse to autocracy—is so rare we must conclude that said vigilance is almost universally effective. In the Western democracies the 1s and 3s have tamed the 2s, with the maturing “baby-boomers” expunging the last remnants of systemic 2-ist sovereign arbitrariness—social conventions seen as

¹ And modern philosophers who explicate 2-ism are rare—Edmund Burke, Russel Kirk, Michael Oakeshott are examples.

² These are parliamentary democracies. Only one presidential democracy has been stable enough to be warrant being called established. It is the oldest modern democracy and it often wobbles.

oppressive and meaningless—around 1968. Subsequently, traditional 2-ist parties have steadily lost political support.

It would seem that as long as the 1s and 3s are fairly evenly matched, 2-ist encroachments on freedom will be effectively checked. That is to say, the required vigilance will be more or less automatic—which somewhat contradicts the meaning of vigilance. Should either 1-ist *influence* or 3-ist *empathy* predominate, we may expect that (in cahoots with 2-ist domination) it will encroach on freedom.

Overweening 1-ism would lead to cronyism and adventurism (e.g., the USA), while excessive 3-ism would show as over-regulation of the economy (modern Sweden). Either distortion might lead to mass surveillance and that aching, perennial longing of the 2s to curb free speech. Presumably, in the functioning democracies when there is a tendency in these directions, vigilant 1s and 3s make a fuss and the 2s have to pull their horns in.

THE POWER OF THE 1s AND 3s

To the extent 1s and 3s recognise each other, their duty to set the world to rights becomes the more urgent and necessary since, in the limit, the 1s know that the self-righteous 3s are fools or knaves and the 3s know the self-regarding 1s are evil exploiters. So both are vociferous; each type sees it as vital that the situation be exposed. Both would assume it is impossible to persuade the seriously wrong-headed to change their minds, which is all the more reason society must be incessantly warned about them.

For the 1s, society progresses through individual innovation and entrepreneurship whereas for the 3s a good society is built by collective cooperation. (From which it follows that 1s will want the government to get out of their way whereas the 3s will want government to act positively.) 1-ist opportunism and

creativity is what produces new and clever ways to exploit the material environment and increase the options for human life. It is 1-ist striving which provides (and destroys) wealth.

Though 3-ism is known as the “progressive” side of politics, it is not good at progress and the 3-ist attempts to build Jerusalem, whether nineteenth century utopias in South America, communist governments, Israeli kibbutzim, hippy communes, or religious cults, have a sombre record of failure.³ The most prominent reason for these failures would be insufficient allowance for individual self-interest. A related, deeper reason would be the 3s’ cavalier attitude toward social process and their view that what counts is the final social utopia—in this world or the next—and that the means of getting to it are of secondary importance; in social matters they seek a just outcome rather than just process (Appendix 1). The resulting procedural improprieties (typical of communist and theocratic governments) alienate too many for durable social stability.

Where society is unjust the 1s would have a hero set it to rights whereas the 3s will hold a mass protest. But the self-aggrandising lone hero, whether Rambo, wealthy philanthropist, or wheeler-dealer political fixer, will hardly make a dent in the problem and may aggravate it.

The 1-ist presumption of individual efficacy logically leads to efforts to neutralise the offending leader (e.g., hunting and killing Osama bin Laden) but this would probably only be effective where the problem itself is 1-ist, and the leader is himself a Type 1, such as a gang boss (not bin Laden who was a charismatic leader).

³ There are exceptions to this 3-ist failure, e.g., the Amish who have developed a durable *modus vivendi*.

Such direct *Team America* style action may provoke hatred which, fuelled by 1-ist pride and proclivity to vengeance, may lead to a test of strength or vendetta. We see such 1-ist escalation in the US crime and incarceration rates and in the failure, over generations, of Israel to achieve peace with the Palestinians.

By contrast, when peaceful protest—power-with—is employed to campaign for social justice, endemic grudges are dampened, not amplified. In modern times this strategy of turning the other cheek (which, to 1s, is contemptible weakness) has often resulted in long-term success. Numerous examples of it may be found in the extensive Wikipedia article on Nonviolent Resistance⁴ and a nice insight into the Type 3 and Type 1 perspectives is given by comparing the Wikipedia article with a Time Magazine photo retrospective on peaceful protest.⁵ Where Time emphasises the individual leaders—Gandhi, Martin Luther King, etc—the Wikipedia article mentions only some of the leaders and then only briefly.

Evidently, *power-with* is a very powerful power. It could be called influence as in “the protest had influence on the government” but that is a category mistake (at least as we are using the word) for *influence* says, “Do this because it is in your interest,” whereas *power-with* says, “Join us in this because it is right” and *empathy* says the same at the private level. Such action would, in many cases, actually be contrary to the protestor’s personal interest. To 1s this is incomprehensible: how can anyone not act in their own interest? The 1s know, deep in their hearts, that everyone, whatever they pretend, is *really* a Type 1 so such people must either be mad or else have some secret agenda or ulterior motive.

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonviolent_resistance

⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20090413011708/http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1887394_1861256,00.html

1-ist influence-power (along with *power-to*) wants to forge ahead (in modern economic terms, to allow the “invisible hand”) to improve the human lot via exploitation of the material world. 1s’ fear of social relations is in part because their one-on-one influence-power is not suited to rectifying collective injustice. By contrast, 3-ist empathy-power and power-with are socially effective by persuading to the path of righteousness; by insisting altruistic social relations are possible and as proof pointing not only to protest movements but to volunteer workers and the poorly paid caring professions. At the same time, technophobic 3-ism reveres and fears nature and is not good at innovation.

3-ist empathy (or *power-with*) has a record of mass-movement success but it is generally not entrepreneurial for 3s are not salespeople. Every time the *influential* Type 1 sells something it proves that people act in their self-interest—as the 1s are quick to point out. When the *empathic* Type 3 persuades a person to righteousness it should perhaps prove people are naturally righteous, however to 3s it does not prove any such thing because righteousness is not special; all people are basically good unless corrupted and it is unrighteousness which is exceptional and deserves comment. Even if, on occasion, there actually is an element of self-interest in joining the righteous, the Type 3 cannot appeal to it for that would demean human nature; it would be hypocrisy. By contrast, the Type 1, for whom unrighteousness is the norm, will say that the person persuaded to apparent righteousness was *really* acting in their self-interest, “virtue signalling” so as to appear morally upright to associates or to God.

This asymmetry has further aspects. Whereas the 3s are confident of their moral rightness and assume everyone agrees, the 1s feel they have to defend their position. The 3s feel no need to justify human kindness and generosity but the 1s need to explain and

justify their way of life because so many people are so full of soft-headed notions of human niceness. 1s know the overriding feature of human psychology is self-interest (academic psychology has no such theory) and this reality needs to be recognised. Only if it is understood can it be harnessed in a productive way. 1s tend to avoid being so crass as to say “Greed is good” but are fond of quoting the father of economics, eighteenth century philosopher Adam Smith’s assertion that self interest is what produces economic prosperity.⁶

When 1s take a leaf from the 3s’ collective-action book, as when industry associations run campaigns to pressure governments for more business-friendly policies, they will surely explain how their case is right and proper, for that is socially expected, but the argument they see as most likely to be effective, particularly behind the scenes, will be that their proposals are positive for the economy and are thus in the interests of the government and its finances and re-election. Every living organism—animal or plant—must act in its self-interest or it will die. The Type 1 assumption is that self-interest is the *only* basis, or the only valid basis, for human action.⁷

⁶ “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.” (Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Book I)

⁷ Not only does 1-ism assume self-interest is the only driver, but economists, who tend to be 1s, compound the bias by assuming (not demonstrating) that self-interest equates to receiving money. Economics theorises about “utility” which is effectively synonymous with self-interest—which is then assumed, without discussion, to mean more money; consequently game theory experiments offer only money as reward.

THE POWER OF THE 2s

The picture painted by this discussion of power is of the 1s and 3s driving society. Ordinarily though, when we think of power we are more likely to think of public manifestations of 2-ism such as the police, army and established church. For long in our past, 2-ism was dominant and it remains powerful today.

The 2-ism familiar to us arose with the beginnings of civilisation thousands of years ago in Eurasia.⁸ Without the 2s maintaining civil order and organising military defence, there can be neither 1-ist trade nor 3-ist morality and city life is not possible.

Through recorded history the 1s and the 3s have kept pace with each other—3-ist outrage reacting to 1-ist exploitation or 1-ist indignation reacting 3-ist suffocation—while the 2s were in the foreground exasperating both 1s and 3s yet also hearing them, and providing the social order essential to them.

In an environment of very dominant 2-ism, the 1s' and 3s' differences would be less noticeable⁹ and sometimes they would unite against the 2s. It is the trick of modern democracy to have made 2-ism the servant of 1-ism and 3-ism, however for most of history 2-ism seems to have been the master with 1-ism supplying its funds and 3-ism supplying its moral legitimacy.

2-ist power is immediate and it is overt whereas the 1s' and 3s' power is long-term and subtle (at least conceptually) with both 1s and 3s actually denying they exercise any power. Though 2-ist organisations

⁸ Other 2-ist societies are traditional Java, the Aztecs, the Azande, the Polynesians.

⁹ Right into the beginning of the twentieth century, Sociologist Max Weber and economist Wilfredo Pareto were lumping 1s and 3s together (in effect, as 1-ism) and distinguishing this from 2-ism.

can persist for centuries, 2-ist power is proximate and short-term. It keeps society in line on a daily basis. 2-ist arrangements will have pervasive and possibly long-term effects but they are not so much the intended result of management and planning as a side-effect of the particular traditions and structure—such as, for example, whether the management hierarchy is based on merit or on heredity.

The 2s are managers and they manage well if their actions deliver predicted outcomes. By contrast, the outcomes of 1s' *influence* and innovations and of 3s' *empathy* and mass movements are almost entirely unpredictable.

It is as if the 2s are monitors preventing the 1s and 3s from doing each other in and allowing them to function, who bend stiffly with variations in the relative pressure of 1-ism and 3-ism, always valuing predictability and preservation of the tried-and-true.

The 2s have proximal power but with no ideology beyond a commitment to upholding order and propriety in social relations (and thus to preserving their power), their vision is limited to stability through hierarchy.

2-ism keeps the ship of society afloat, maintaining its many systems and coordinating contributions to the complex whole. Bureaucrats would frankly see themselves in this role, recognising their hierarchy in which subordinate ranks report to the officers on the bridge who try to steer straight ahead, at moderate speed, holding the course that they see as having been effective so far.

The course and speed are perturbed by the 1s and 3s employing their forms of power (power-to/influence and power-with/empathy) to attempt to pull the wheel either right toward rich fishing grounds at full steam ahead or else left away from reefs and icebergs at dead slow. The 2s resist both. On the one hand, 2s see there

is more to life than material consumption and they worry about over-fishing; on the other hand, while they are anxious to avoid shipwreck, the crew and passengers have to be fed which requires some risks to be taken—and they have, anyway, no confidence in any 3-ist social utopia.

So self-effacing 2-ist *domination* services the engine, mans the pumps, does not direct the voyage but holds course, allowing the wheel and speed to be nudged, not wrenched, by *influence* and *empathy*. Where 2-ism attempts to set the course, where it uses its *domination* power to relegate the 1s and 3s to serve its own, 2-ist, conception of the just life, the self-importance will steer toward oppression and despotism.

THE POWER OF THE 4s

The 4s ye have always with you. What power, in terms of social effects, do they have? On their own, not much. In their normal, unorganised state, their mistrust, their unaffectedness, and their lack of refinement can, through democratic vote, constrain the conceits and posturings of the three pro-active types whose preferences and prejudices pervade politics.

The 4s are probably most effective where 4-ist apathy is countered by compulsory voting, as in Australia and a few other countries. In some circumstances Type 4 recalcitrance and inclination to lash out can puncture middle class hubris, vivid contemporary examples being the UK's "Brexit" referendum vote to leave the EU and the US election of Donald Trump.¹⁰

The 4s, unionised and led by 3s (with determination and perhaps ruthlessness) may win improvements to

¹⁰ In Australia constitutional change requires a national referendum, which only the government can initiate. Nearly all the 45 proposals to date (since 1901) were to increase federal power. 37 were rejected and mistrust, particularly in Foursville, was the basic reason.

their income and working conditions and drive legislation mitigating social inequality. Such achievements would depend on solidarity which in turn would depend upon compulsion, particularly compulsory union membership. Unless 4s are coerced they will “defect” and be “free riders,” i.e., look for the short-term payoff, and so undermine the power-with effectiveness of a united position.

Organised as the tool of the one of the other three social types, the 4s may have significant social impact—partly unwittingly and often not to their own advantage. While the 1s sell, the 2s regulate and the 3s preach, the 4s are the ones who physically produce goods and services.

Led by a 1-ist demagogue 4s can be deluded into thinking they have power. “Buy a gun,” says the merchant, “for it is in your interest.” Gun-owning 4s who actually try to demonstrate their power end up dead or in jail and the power is accumulated by the National Rifle Association.

Led by 3-ist revolutionaries, the 4s man the barricades to build a perfect society in which they will have equal power with everyone else. They might promote this by killing anyone with an air of superiority or intellectualism.

That mess will eventually be sorted out by some heavy-handed 2-ism (Napoleon, Lenin, the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia) with the 2-ism relying on 4s as cannon-fodder at the bottom of the hierarchy. Here 4s can be particularly effective, not only because they may be trained and organised to act in a concerted manner but because they are at home in a coercive environment.

Type 4s are the only democrats

For political stability, the three pro-active types must be in balance. This can obtain as long as none of them

attracts the overwhelming allegiance of the 4s. This implies democratic government. Each of the three proactive types thinks it should rule which means, by definition, that none of them has a democratic attitude—contrary to the 1s' and 3s' insistent claims. The 4s, however, would endorse the basic democratic notion that everyone should have an equal say in making the rules, though they would consider it a pipe-dream, not worth thinking about.

So if there are any attitudinal democrats, they are the 4s. Since the 4s cannot coherently act on their attitudes unless led by the proactive types, their democratic inclination will only be effective if the three pro-active types are in constant competition for the 4s' allegiance—the 4-ist vote—and in this competition none of the three should succeed too well.

As the only ones in a democratic polity who might have a democratic mindset, the 4s unwittingly maintain the democracy as long as they respond to overtures from the pro-active types with even-handed apathy and suspicion.

THE POWER OF THE 5s

The previous chapter showed that only if you are not in society can you be free of others' power. That is, only the 5s have total power over themselves. Not just *power-over*: Type 5s are often ascetics which is to say they go further and seek to escape material dependence (*power-to*) which usually means they try to escape the demands of their own bodies—to so lower their needs as to subjectively acquire a surplus of *power-to*—and thereby free themselves of hope and fear and all the urges that hold sway over human beings.

In this volume, the hermit does not receive the attention given to the four social types. A book about social relations can hardly have much to say about a type which is not social. Consequently, our interest in

the Type 5 is mainly in its *deviation* from the theoretical ideal. That is, in empirical cases where 5s on the fringes of society do participate to some extent, where, in the zero-sum realm of *power-over*, some room is made for the hermit.

The Type 5's power would be mainly by setting an example which would be *influence* or *empathy*. Said Mary Douglas, anthropologist and inventor of grid-group theory (Appendix 4):

...the withdrawn individual is not necessarily silent. Immune as far as possible from the pressures of other people, the hermit none the less speaks to the wider society. Though he is off our map of social control, in the very act of evasion he presents a view of what human nature might be like. What he says on this subject is powerfully interesting to others caught in the toils he has escaped. (1982 [1978]: 204)

Thailand

Admired hermits attract acolytes. In Thailand, the 5-ist power of example is actually institutionalised and integrated into the society. Most men spend a period of time—months, a year or two—as a Buddhist monk before reverting to civilian life. They find a satisfaction in minimising their material needs and in venturing forth with the alms bowl, dispensing blessings and receiving gifts of food.

Is there an element of *domination* in the potential to withhold blessings? They probably do not withhold, irrespective of the alms. Is there an element of *influence* in this exchange? That would be if the food or the blessings were seen to be conditional upon each other which they probably are not. So it would be *empathy* holding the system together—quashing sentiments of *domination* or *influence*.

In his famous essay, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, political philosopher Isaiah Berlin considers 5-ism:

This is the traditional self-emancipation of ascetics and quietists, of stoics or Buddhist sages, men of various religions or of none, who have fled the world, and escaped the yoke of society or public opinion, by some process of deliberate self-transformation that enables them to care no longer for any of its values, to remain, isolated and independent, on its edges, no longer vulnerable to its weapons.

If the 5s don't care for society's values and are no longer vulnerable to society's weapons, society has no power over them. After some discussion, Berlin decides that 5-ism is not real freedom and settles for the two traditional concepts, negative freedom and positive freedom.¹¹

Such is Berlin's considered, outsider judgement. Subjectively though, the 5s have the freedom of being beyond bothering to have an opinion on freedom (or on any other social concern) and the reverence they are accorded would indicate that others also see them as free.

At any rate, "Thai" means "free" and since practically the whole population is Buddhist, the Thais do apparently find withdrawal to be a significant form of freedom.

¹¹ Negative freedom (or freedom-from) *permits* persons to acquire as much *influence* over others as they can; positive freedom (freedom-to) *enables* persons to *empathise* within social equality (see also Appendix 1).

Indonesia

If the institutionalisation in Thailand conflicts with the fundamental concept of 5-ism, the hermit's traditional role in Indonesia is perhaps even more striking.

In the power struggles of the very 2-ist Hindu and Buddhist empires and dynasties which characterised the millennium before Islam and the Dutch arrived, the hermit was perceived to have a unique understanding of Power (capitalised to indicate the Indonesian conception of it as a substance one can possess) and his disinterestedness gave him real *power-over*.

...in traditional Java... ...there remained on the fringes of society one important type of intellectual with a special role to play. This type is represented in pre-Islamic traditional literature by hermits and sages... ...usually residing in isolated caves or lonely mountainsides, remote from society. Their physical isolation expressed a fundamental separation from the interdependencies of community life... ...The ajar... ...withdrew from society to cultivate clairvoyance, study the secrets of the cosmos, and prepare himself for death... ...The wayang stories and chronicles are filled with descriptions of these revered figures, whose asceticism gives them special insight into the inner state of the world and into the future flow of Power within it. The typical role of the seer is to diagnose decay within the kingdom and warn of the impending downfall of the dynasty. (Anderson 1990: 63)

Such a warning was itself likely to abet the downfall. That sort of power is not *empathy*; it is *influence* or even *dominance*. Anderson relates that the classical ajar vanished with the coming of Islam in the 13th to 16th centuries and the role was taken by rural holy

men called kyai whose religion remained “intuitive, personal and mystical.”

The kyai normally remained aloof from the political life of the state. Only in times of distress and confusion were they likely to emerge... ..to play brief but at times decisive roles in the collapse of the old order and the emergence of the new before retiring once again to their former isolation... ..The kyai has thus appeared to have inherited much of the role and status of the ajar before him.

In the colonial period, the rural kyai... ..remained an abiding preoccupation of the alien rulers. Like the traditional kingdoms, the bureaucratic colonial polity found no structural place for the kyai... (65)

These powerful 5s seem to have been a last-resort political stabiliser, using their esoteric understanding of who has Power and who is losing or gaining it to influence events. In the Indonesian case the Type 5 deviates from his 5-ism—temporarily joins society to exercise power—when his society—the society he is outside of—is in some kind of crisis. It seems hardly relevant nowadays, but perhaps we can imagine the reclusive widower intervening in a family dispute, or the older professor who seldom appears outside his office, intervening in a department controversy.¹²

Asceticism is not essential

In seeking freedom from dependence on the material world at the same time as freedom from the power of

¹² In European history the hermit has been only a bit-player, present but peripheral. In Thailand and Indonesia he seems to have been a central figure. This example shows that viewing history through a WOLT lens might yield fresh insights.

others, otherworldly 5s hint at a link between *power-to* and *power-over*. In part this may be merely because human societies have always been poor so if you are to free yourself from a craving for material resources then the simplest tactic is to deny you need them. It is the tradition of the Sufi, yogi, gnostic, fakir, and monk. These people seek a higher truth and for such a search to become a tradition potentially widely available, will require the seeker to deny a need for daily, mundane things.

Can a rich man be a Type 5? It seems so. The Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, was very much a Type 5. Is the rich recluse such as Howard Hughes and Greta Garbo, a genuine hermit or just paranoid? It seems that asceticism, though common among 5s, is not essential: the Epicureans were 5s and the philosopher Spinoza, who is sometimes compared with the Greek stoics, famously said:

It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with decoration, music, sports, the theatre, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without injury to another. (Garrett 1996: 58)

Spinoza wanted to counter melancholy “...so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things.”

Typical 5-ism: cultivate the mind to understand many things.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The previous chapters showed how *power-over* has three components: *empathy*, *influence*, and *domination* which fit on the X, Y, and Z axes and that these power relations are an intrinsic part of being social. This chapter has traced some of the interactions of the three

kinds of power-over: how the different types exert power and misunderstand each other.

When it comes to social problems the 1s' Lone Ranger mindset, so effective entrepreneurially, fails. By contrast, the 3s' passive protest action—both *empathy* and *power-with*—is socially effective but 3s cannot organise positively. Both 1s and 3s need 2-ism to maintain an environment where they can function. For their part, the 2s should be administrators, implementing social policies guided by the 1s and 3s. The 4s' unaffectedness and disdain for the airs of the pro-active types can be healthy, and the incorruptibility of the 5s may in some special circumstances let them influence the course of politics.

It adds up to a strong case that however uncomfortable they are with each other, a balance of the types is necessary for a stable society and for—what may be the same thing—a free, just and prosperous society. The WOLT types are essentially states of mind and are the product of social communication, so the balance will depend on communication being free and fair.

The 4s are the people who actually *do* things and their power is somewhat indirect; to exercise power effectively they must be led by one of the proactive types and there is a high chance that will be exploitative. If puncturing the pretensions of the three proactive types is essential for a stable society, then the 4s' power is real and essential. If any type is psychologically democratic, it can only be the Type 4 and the 4s will be effective in maintaining a democratic polity if they respond to the pro-active types' overtures with unbiased distrust.

Presumably, 5s are going to appear wherever there is an economic surplus to support them. Although in principle they are non-social and have no power at all, wider society is conscious of them and aware of the option of social withdrawal. Historical instances

indicate their elder, non-partisan status can give them influence and empathy power with which they may affect the society from which they have withdrawn.□

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